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Constitudonal Problems
of the ·1ntemational Economic Sgstem
and the Multilateral
lfade Negotiation Results
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....

by John H. Jackson
Professor of Law, University of Michigan
(Adapted from a paper delivered at the annual meeting of
the American Society of International Law, Washington,
D.C., April 26, 1979.)

The Tokyo round is now completed. Even discounting the
hyperbole of the government negotiators, it is an impressive
accomplishment. As the seventh major trade negotiating
round in the context of GATT, the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, this multilateral trade negotiation, or
"MTN" as it is often called, may well live up to the claim
that it is the most far-reaching of any of the trade
negotiating rounds, except perhaps the first when the GATT
itself was drafted . It is particularly impressive coming as it
did during a time of trauma for the international economic
system, as well as a time of economic "stagflation" coupled
with narrow parliamentary majorities for the governments
of virtually all of the major participants in the negotiation.
Considerable commentary has been published about the
"protectionist trends" in the world during the last half
decade . It has not been a time of farsighted leadership. The
negotiation results bear the scars and blemishes of the
gauntlet which it had to run. But for the first time since the
original GATT, there has been a major extension of
international discipline for non-tariff barriers. Previous
rounds have tried and failed to achieve this, and to some
extent this round also failed; but when one considers the
extent and scope of what has been accomplished,
particularly as compared to what seemed possible even one
year ago, it is hard not to be impressed.
Yet there are criticisms which can be made. It can be
reasonably argued that the overall economic impact of the

negotiation results will be minimal. The tauted advantages
of trade liberalization may not be great in this case, because
there is not that much trade liberalization. As usual at the
end of a trade negotiation, claims are being made on both
sides of this issue, but it appears that this has been a "hold
the line" negotiation more than anything else, and in some
cases the line has not been held. For example, the failure to
complete a "safeguards agreement" and thus bring
discipline to the safeguards or escape clause area is
ominous, particularly in the face of signs that some major
trading countries seem d,etermined to go their own way on
safeguards, regardless of even those weak international
obligations which may now exist. Some of the extraordinary
ambiguity in the Subsidies-Countervailing Duty Code,
designed to paper over the lack of real agreement, could be
the refuge of some future safeguards or escape clause-type
actions by governments, damaging to the principles of
economic cooperation and interdependence. Some of these
provisions will be extended to the anti-dumping subject
where they could be even more risky. In this regard a
careful formulation of the injury test, such as utilizing the
phrase "material injury" in the U.S. implementing
legislation, is an important improvement.
Some of the "side deals," such as on cheese, as well as
certain provisions of some of the codes, suggest "organized
free trade" ideas, designed to let governments manage
trade and in some cases to manage it in a way to minimize
domestic political opposition rather than to promote
broader objectives of world well-being or even national
well-being. Likewise the price of obtaining domestic
support for the implementation of the negotiation results
may have been high, and one cannot escape the feeling that
the public is not yet privy to the private bargains that have
been made. Finally, a major deficiency of this negotiation
may be the failure once again to draw the less developed
countries into a constructive and progressive relationship to
the world trading system.
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For all this, however, it is true that we now have
international rules and at least some skeleton procedures
for important areas of potential international conflict
arising out of non-tariff measures, such as standards,
government procurement, and many subtle government
subsidy practices. Some salve has been put on old festering
sores, such as customs valuation. The American Selling
Price question may finally be resolved.
My purpose in this paper, however, is not to try to
appraise the overall economic results of the negotiation, but
rather to look at one particular aspect of the negotiation
results which is peculiarly appropriate for examination by
lawyers. By this I refer to the "institutional" or
"constitutional" implications of the Tokyo round. I have on
other occasions expressed my views about the
constitutional problems of GATT, meaning the problems of
its basic legal structure and problems of its procedures and
methods of operation. I would like only to briefly review
some of those viewpoints here, and then to examine the
MTN results in the light of those weaknesses and of the
other needs of a stable and progressively improving
international economic system.

II
At the time of its origin, the GATT was never intended to
play the role it has been forced to play. It was conceived as
a reciprocal tariff reduction agreement, to be appended as a
subsidary to the International Trade Organization, which
never came into being. When the ITO failed to materialize
in the late 1940s, the GATT became the only viable
international institution for assisting nations to resolve their
international trade policy differences, and thus the GATT
began to evolve into the central international institution for
trade as we know it today. This uncertain beginning
explains many of the defects and difficulties of GATT. In
fact, the GATT has served world trade and economic wellbeing far better than anyone had a right to expect. But in the
last decade or so, a number of its constitutional infirmities
have begun to catch up with it, as international economic
interdependence, the quadrupling of GATT membership,
the inclusion in that membership of countries with greatly
divergent stages and theories of economics, and the crises
of energy and unemployment, have all buffeted the GATT,
the international economic system generally, and national
governments.
We now find a series of weaknesses in the existing
institution of the GATT. For example:
1) It is difficult if not impossible to amend the GATT for a
variety of reasons. Thus it has not been possible to keep
GATT's specific rules relating to trade, up-to-date.
2) Partly because of that fact, but also for a number of
other reasons including the trauma of economic
developments, compliance with GATT rules has been
faltering. Some GATT rules are virtually ignored, in some
cases because the rules have been found illsuited to current
problems. But the tendency for governments to ignore
existing obligations can be said to be spreading, as testified
to by more eminent authorities than myself. Rule noncompliance becomes habit forming.
3) The dispute settlement procedures of GATT have not
been working well. Indeed, on certain subjects, and at
certain times, these procedures have virtually broken
down, engendering increased ill will between nations, and
26

evoking some remarkably poignant criticisms from, among
others. members of the United States Congress.
4) The GATT decision-making structure has always been
awkward and not well designed to reconcile widely
divergent viewpoints or to create new rules which would
likely be effective . There has been a tendency at certain
periods of the GATT history to view the GATT merely as a
forum for discussion and comparison of views on
international economic policy. The question is: will such
loose structure adequately cope with the kinds of problems
we have now or can reasonably expect in the structure?

5) The uneasy relationship of developing country
economic and trade policy to the GATT rules has always
been the subject of dispute and some acrimony. The
growing industrial capacity of some developing countries
promises to put additional strain on the adjustment
capabilities of the older more mature industrial countries,
and this also poses problems for the traditional GATT rules
which probably cannot be resolved under the existing
GATT legal structure.

6) There are of course, other particular criticisms that can
be made of the GATT, some of them focusing more on the
substance than on its procedures or "constitution." For
example, trade in agricultural goods has never really
followed the GATT rules. Likewise, there seems to be a
trend away from compliance with at least the spirit, if.not
the letter, of the most-favored-nation principle imbedded in
GATT. Finally, the habit of CATT-sponsored significant but
infrequent major trade negotiating rounds has often
delayed the development of needed reforms or rule
changes between those rounds.

III
How, then, do the results of the MTN affect the
institutional infirmities of GATT? Time does not permit a
detailed analysis of this question, but I can present a few
subjects to stimulate yqur imagination and thoughts.
First, with respect to the basic constitutional structure of
the international trading system, the MTN results have not
at all improved that structure . The GATTwill not be
amended as such, which is not surprising in light of the
difficulty of amending it as well as the risks of attempting to
amend it. In addition, not only will the GATT itself not be
amended, but the technique of creating a series of "side
agreements" or separate "codes" has been indulged in to
the fullest. This was perhaps inevitable, and indeed
desirable from a number of points of view, but we must
recognize the effect it can have on the overall institutional
structure of the international trade system. Under the MTN
codes as negotiated, we are creating a series of new standalone treaties, many of which also create supervisory
committees utilizing various names such as "Committee of
Signatories." Each of these committees apparently will be,
in effect, a new "mini" international organization, a
separate legal entity from that of GATT. Under each of
these codes, while there is reference to GATT,
nevertheless, there will be separate decision-making
processes, separate dispute settlement processes, and in
some cases rules about subjects which are also covered in
the GATT agreement. Whether explicitly stated or not, the
clear implication is that the code rules will take precedence
over the previous GATT rules, at least as to the code
signatories.

The result is a sort of "Balkanization" of the GATT
structure. The centrifugal forces have been carried further,
and a certain amount of subject jurisdiction will effectively
he withdrawn from the general GATT consultative
processes, weak as they are , and placed in limited
membership side agreement or code "committees." Thus,
although the total system when viewed overall has been
expended to encompass additional subject matter,
particularly of non-tariff measures, the core institution, the
GATT itself, has probably been weakened. In any event, I
think it is impossible to seriously argue that the overall
institutional structure of the international trading system
has been strengthened. Few if any of the specific
weaknesses of that system have been redressed . From a
longer range point of view, a view that would extend even a
decade or two ahead, it is clear that the MTN can only be
characterized as a superb exercise in ad hoc-ery. Much
important works remains to be done.

IV
Now let me turn to some specifics.
The "legal context" of a set of rules includes at least two
important institutions: an institution or set of institutions for
creating new rules or changing old rules, i.e., "rule-making"
procedures; and an institution or set of procedures for
applying the rules and resolving disputes about them. I
think a strong argument can be made that rules without
these two institutions will become ineffective, and that
weaknesses in either of these procedures will affect the
stability of compliance with the rules. Let me first take up
the question of rule-making procedures.
The GATT decision-making structure is not elaborate, to
say the least. There is provision for joint action by the
"contracting parties" under Article 25 of CATT, and this
provision is remarkably broad and ambiguous although it
has been cautiously used . The GATT, like many
international organizations, provides that each member
nation shall have one vote, and that on most issues a
majority of votes shall prevail. This one-nation-one-vote
system has many significant weaknesses in the context of
international law today, but I cannot dwell upon those
weaknesses here.
In general, the GATT does not use a voting system for
"rule-making." Instead , the tradition of CATT is that new
obligations or changes in the text of old obligations are
binding only on those who accept them as part of a newly
negotiated treaty instrument. Under the GATT, to amend
the text of the GATT rules themselves requires a two-thirds
majority of CATT and in some cases unanimity. The process
is cumbersome enough such that it is now deemed almost
impossible to use, except for certain situations which have a
strong appeal to the large developing nation majority which
now exists in CATT.
Although attempts have been made in CATT to improve
the decision-making process, they have been largely
unsuccessful. The negotiation procedure, on the other hand,
while giving considerable emphasis to the real power
relationship of the member nations may in fact result in less
participation by the less powerful members of the
international trading system than would a system which
departed from a strict one-nation-one-vote procedure.
The MTN largely ignored these institutional questions.
Indeed, while setting up a series of committees in
connection with each of the major codes, voting was left
astonishingly ambiguous in those codes. For example, the
wording found in the Subsidies-Countervailing-Measure
Code, similar to those of several other agreements,

establishes a Committee of Signatories composed of
representatives from each of the signatories to the code
agreement. But nothing is said about voting- an almost
incredible omission.
One answer that is commonly made by apologists of the
agreements and the present CATT voting structure is that
voting is not the usual technique of resolving differences.
That answer is often true as far as it goes, but if consensus
on procedure as well as substance breaks down, it is
possible that the resort in a controversy may be to a vote.
Since nations which are trying to form a consensus know
that this is the final procedural step after a failure to arrive
at consensus, the potential voting or decision structure will
necessarily influence the earlier processes of negotiating
towards a consensus on various issues. Any member of a
parliamentary body can easily verify this observation. Any
lawyer who negotiates a settlement for his client can also
verify that the negotiation will be greatly if not decisively
influenced by the predictions of the negotiators as to what
result would occur if the matter in fact went to litigation.
Counting Supreme Court noses is one of the favorite past
times of our profession.
It is thus all the more disconcerting to further analyze the
ambiguity of the MTN codes on this matter. Since voting is
not mentioned, it is at least within the realm of possibility
that if "push comes to shove" interpretative activity will
conclude that the voting will be by the familiar onemember-one-vote process, with a majority prevailing. You
will recall that the code language established that each
signatory can be represented in the committee. Another
clause in these codes typically reads that the code
agreement is "open for acceptance by signature or
otherwise; by governments contracting parties to the CATT
and by the European Economic Community." Thus the EC
and its members together could assert the right to have 10
signatories-9 member states plus the EC itself-on the
committee. It is possible therefore for the EC to assert a
right to 10 votes, as compared to one for the United States or
Canada or Japan, although there may be an informal
understanding to the contrary, or the EC may refrain from
asserting these voting rights. If, as it appears likely at the
beginning, the codes generally have only between 20 to 30
members, one can see at least potential risks for United
States international trade policy which the new Balkanized
system will pose.
It is true that in many dases the committees are formally
given little or no power. That fact in itself underscores the
lack of institutional reform which will occur under the
MTN agreement. But in some cases the relevant committee
does have potentially ultimate and decisive power in the
dispute settlement procedures. The combination of these
institutional weaknesses and ambiguities could fatally
weaken those procedures. It could also put certain code
members, such as the EC, effectively above the law. Or, less
dramatically, it could result in the United States and other
nations finding it necessary to summon exceedingly skillful
diplomatic techniques to avoid being a supplicant in
practical negotiations under the operation of the code
concerned.
Even in cases where the relevant committee has no
formal decision-making authority as the only official
international agency to oversee the operation of a new
code, it is likely to have considerable influence,
particularly in early years, over the process of interpreting
that code. Thus again , those nations which can play a
dominating role in a committee at these early stages will
have important opportunities to shape the operation of a
code to their own liking.
I do not mean to imply that these defects are fatal, or that
they should lead one to oppose the MTN results. Quite the
contrary. The advantages of the MTN still appear to
outweigh the disadvantages. I present this analysis,
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however, to demonstrate, first how little priority seems to
have been given in the MTN to basic institutional problems,
and second to point out that the work is not finished, either
for the international community or for the United States
government itself. For the United States government to
successfully manage its economic interests in the difficult
diplomatic milieau which it has helped create will call for
considerable improvement in its internal organization and
marshalling of diplomatic skills. Thus, the MTN does not
address central and important structural issues of the
international trading system. And in addition, the MTN has
added to the complexity of that system by setting up a series
of new international legal entities.

v
Let me now turn to the dispute settlement procedures.
Rule application is increasingly being recognized as an
important aspect of international diplomacy. A good part of
the controversy about the potential SALT agreement is on
the question of verifiability and thus effectiveness of the
obligations incurred. The provisional drafts resulting from
the law of the sea conferences include elaborate disputesettlement procedures, also indicating a high degree of
interest in the question of whether rules, which are
agonizingly arrived at, will in fact be effective in guiding
conduct, providing stability, and allowing reliance. A
dispute settlement mechanism is often the chief technique
for rule application, and once again it is important to
examine the results of the MTN in connection with the
infirmities of the CATT dispute settlement mechanism to
which I have alluded earlier.
The MTN negotiators did attempt, very late in the
negotiation, to improve the dispute settlement mechanisms
now contained in CATT. One small portion of the
negotiations tried to address the CATT dispute settlement
mechanisms themselves and to improve them. However,
the results I think were largely a failure. It appears that
some trading 'countries, particularly the European
Economic Community, were adamantly opposed to
improvement of the dispute settlement procedures of
CATT. This fact alone could be taken as a danger signal
with respect to the viability and potential effectiveness of
the very elaborate rules resulting from the MTN.
In each of the various codes there is a separate dispute
settlement mechanism. I have argued elsewhere that to
have a fragmented or "Balkanized" dispute settlement
mechanisms is itself a mistake, but I won't repeat those
arguments here. Some of the procedures in the non-tariff
measure codes regarding disputes settlements do make
some modest improvements on the CATT dispute
settlement system.
What is it that one should look for in an improved dispute
settlement procedure? I suggest the following:

processes of compromise which inevitably reduces the
effectiveness and reliability of rules and can progressively
weaken a dispute settlement process, the fulcrum of a
dispute settlement mechanism should be the establishment
of an opportunity to obtain an impartial and trusted
decision or finding as to the interpretation or application of
a previously agreed rule. Mixing that fulcrum with more
political-like processes of conciliation, or policy
formulation, can easily breed distrust in the procedure.
3) A consultation and a conciliation process can be an
effective part of a dispute settlement mechanism, but
should be reasonably separated from the third-party
impartial findings.

4) The procedure should prevent foot dragging and delay,
and force reasonably prompt resolution of disputes.
5) The agencies or personnel of the dispute settlement
mechanism should have reasonably unambiguous direction
as to their authorities and their objectives. Language such
as that found in CATT article XXIII, "Nullification or
Impairment," which is inherently ambiguous and creates
disputes about the dispute settlement process, should be
avoided .
How then do the various dispute settlement mechanisms
resulting from the MTN negotiations stack up to some of
these criteria? Unfortunately, not too well. A number of the
procedures offer the hope of helping to avoid some of the
foot-dragging and delay problems which have occurred in
the past under the CATT procedures. Likewise, some of
these procedures do offer the opportunity of expanding the
list of available persons to act as impartial third party panel
members, to help resolve one problem that has plagued the
CATT process.
However, all too often the procedures explicitly mention
the ambiguous "nullification or impairment" criteria.
Likewise, the dispute settlement procedure often charges a
third party panel with the conflicting duties of conciliation
and objective determination of compliance with a rule .
The dispute settlement mechanism contained in the all
important Subsidy-Countervailing Duty code perhaps goes
the farthest in improving upon the more traditional CATT
processes. There is at least some attempt in the wording of
the agreement to separate the conciliation process from the
third-party panel process, and the panel is charged with
setting forth a finding as\ o "questions of fact in the
application of the relevant provisions .... "
A basic problem in this code, which also exists to a
somewhat lesser extent in some of the other codes, is the
extraordinary ambiguity of some of the substantive rules of
the code.

VI

1) An improved dispute settlement mechanism should be

built on modest expectations, at least at the start. It should
not be expected that all rules will be immediately complied
with, or that all judgments of the dispute settlement
mechanism will be immediately followed. However, the
mechanism should be designed so that as time goes on,
greater and greater confidence will likely be placed in the
system so that gradually greater responsibilities can be
added to it.
2) In order to establish that the dispute settlement
mechanism relies primarily on reference to rules and their
application, as opposed to the political and diplomatic
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Finally, let me turn to another dimension of the
institutional problems we have been discussing.
There is one institutional or constitutional aspect of the
trade negotiations which may hold considerable promise
for the future. For many years in the U.S. the
constitutionally imposed tension between the executive
branch and the Congress has been particularly felt in
connection with the conduct of United States foreign
economic relations. I am sure most are familiar with the
decades of Congressional hostility to the CATT, or to the
sorry story regarding the anti-dumping code after the last
trade negotiation round. The U.S. constitutional system, for

what I believe to he wise and proper reasons, stimulates
this tension between the branches of our government, but
this constitutional structure has its price and the price may
he rather high in the context of international relations in a
contemporary interdeperident world. Thus it is extremely
interesting to trace the development of the new procedure
for approving the MTN agreement which was established in
the 1974 Trade Act, and has only recently been worked out
in a series of practical accommodations between the
Executive Branch and the relevant Congressional
committees. There are problems with the process, of
course . The "up or down" vote with no amendments,
coupled with the elaborate Congressional-executive
consultation process prior to the drafting of the bill to be
tabled , has, I believe, worked reasonably well ; it is
interesting to note that there was agreement between the
executive branch and Congressional committees to extend
this procedure, which would otherwise expire January 1980.
Beyond this, however, the United States government
needs to give considerably more attention to its own
internal structure for representing U.S . longer range
international economic interests. It would be dangerous
indeed to view the MTN process as a job finished, to see the
dispersal of experienced talent, and to hope that the new
complex, intricate, and ambiguous tangle of international
rules which has come out of the MTN could now be put on
the shelf, like a wound up clock, to operate by itself. It will
take great skill and resources, both within the U.S.
government and at the international level, to keep these
MTN results from becoming merely another addition to the
useless debris left strewn on the international landscape,
such as the unfortunate 1948 ITO charter, the stillborn 1955
Organization for Trade Cooperation, the Kennedy Round
Grains agreement, and the Kennedy Round American
Selling Price agreement.
In short, we have the possibility of a new beginning. Let
us hope that the plethora of ad hoc MTN results can become
structural bricks to he given some foundation and some
longer range stability.

John H . Jackson
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